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I find this wording at predicate rather odd:
…a predicate is a statement…
Philosophers would say ’is blue’ is a predicate, while ’x is blue’ is a statement.
If a (unary) predicate over is to be thought of as a subject of , so, if in a topos, a map , isn’t the associated statement , for some (perhaps variable) arrow .
In philosophy, it’s never the case that
The term proposition may be used synonymously with ‘predicate’.
With ’statement’ yes, but not with ’predicate’.
Suggestions? Would ’expression’ be better?
Philosophers would say ’is blue’ is a predicate, while ’x is blue’ is a statement.
I think that mathematicians find ‘is blue’ too nebulous; you need a placeholder. At the very least, the predicate should be ‘ is blue.’ or the function ‘[] is blue.’.
The cleanest approach (as stated in the article but perhaps not with adequate explanation) is to specify the context first. This makes it clear that we don’t have two distinct predicates ‘ is blue.’ and ‘ is blue.’ … unless in a context where both of these variables appear, in which these should be distinguished! (I don’t know how to do that with just ‘is blue’.)
A predicate is a term applicable to those entities which share some property. It refers to a concept. For Frege it is ’unsaturated’, waiting for a name to turn it into a proposition. It’s rather than .
Could we say then that a predicate names an arrow in a topos with codomain , or a subobject of an object, and a proposition/statement names an arrow , or a subobject of ?
For Frege [a predicate] is ’unsaturated’, waiting for a name to turn it into a proposition. It’s rather than .
It’s interesting that you say this, because I just came online to remark upon it. In mathematical logic, there seems to be a trend away from an approach dealing with a function from terms to propositions, so that one writes (for a variable) or more generally (for a term), to an approach where is the entire statement that previously would have been written and so one must write (meaning the result of substituting the term for the variable in the proposition ) for what would previously have been written . Paul Taylor even goes so far as to write to emphasise that this is a pullback.
Could we say then that a predicate names an arrow in a topos with codomain , or a subobject of an object, and a proposition/statement names an arrow , or a subobject of ?
I’m not sure if you mean anything by saying ‘names’ here instead of ‘is’. Anyway, one certainly could use terminology this way, but why do we need two words for the latter? (I’m not sure that I knew that ‘statement’ was used in a technical sense by anybody.)
Another terminology, which I associate (possibly unfairly) with dumbed down secondary-school courses, is ‘open sentence’ (with one or more free variables) and ‘closed sentence’ (without).
I actually like the terms ’open’ and ’closed’, because one can connect them with topological meanings. If one writes down string diagram (or even better, surface diagram) representations of terms in a predicate calculus, then free variables correspond to open input and output strings. The act of quantifying (say, existentially quantifying) can be likened to the act of “capping off” an open string to make it closed; you get a closed term by capping off or binding all the open strings. This idea really goes back to Peirce and his system Beta.
Re 5, ’names’ rather than ’is’ , I was trying to indicate the philosophers’ distinction between the words used to designate a property or concept and the property or concept itself. It’s really quite a mess because there’s the further issue of intensional or extensional identity, e.g., is the concept ’has a heart’ the same as ’has a liver’ if they have the same extension.
As for statement/proposition, these have to made to fit with sentence and assertion. There’s no unanimity. The Wikipedia page shows some of the confusion.
If it can all be boiled down to arrow talk, things could get a lot clearer.
Think about the latter paragraph of comment 4. Here we see explicitly that a proposition is a special case of a predicate, since is an object. But given an object , we may pass to the slice category over , and now we see that a predicate is a proposition in a different context.
I have written proposition almost entirely anew; take a look.
I still think that anyone coming from philosophy will be very confused but what they will see as a conflation of ’proposition’ and ’predicate’. I wonder what others think. Oddly, despite this, we don’t even have the pages proposition and predicate talking to each other.
’categorial logic’ could link to logic.
The usage I am familiar with in mathematical logic is that a proposition is a statement containing no free variables, whereas a predicate is a statement possibly containing free variables. Would it be sufficient for the philosophers, David C, if we added a remark like
In philosophy, the variable in a predicate is usually elided, so that one writes simply “is blue” rather than “ is blue”. The mathematical version which contains a variable is more precise, as it specifies exactly where in the statement the entity in question is to be substituted.
?
Having a free variable looks like just a trick of axiomatic mathematics, not something what is universal beyond mathematics to other disciplines. In linguistics indeed one starts with say a semantic entity which is represented by say a verb phrase and then the knowledge of language puts it into a semantic relation with certain closed and certain open classes of other entities which it can apply to. Human is thursty. in a surrealistic stretch computer can also be thirsty. By no means emptiness (abstract notion) can be thirsty, though poetry can put it into action.
Oddly, despite this, we don’t even have the pages proposition and predicate talking to each other.
Yes we do; they are (and have always been) the same page! That you see the latter as different is just the dreaded cache bug.
I still think that anyone coming from philosophy will be very confused but what they will see as a conflation of ’proposition’ and ’predicate’.
Will be they be confused by the last paragraph under ## Predicates ##, where predicates are viewed as propositional functions? I have just added a justification of that view to the paragraph on toposes in ## category-theoretic logic ##.
’categorial logic’ could link to logic.
Right now, categorial logic and categorical logic redirect to internal logic, but this doesn’t seem right to me. (The link that I wrote was to category-theoretic logic, which remains unfulfilled.)
By no means emptiness (abstract notion) can be thirsty, though poetry can put it into action.
Wondering whether emptiness is thirsty seems to me to be a type error. (The poetry apparently supplies a conversion between types.)
Right, you can try to make it type error in a synchronic system, but the language is changing under the influence of semantics, including typically changing the rules for such barriers for certain lexical or semantic groups or idioms.
Re 12, ah, the dreaded cache bug. The idea is to have what’s at ’Proposition’ as the future page? Why not title it ’Predicate’ and then describe whatever we eventually decide about its relation to ’proposition’? At predicate, we have
The term proposition may be used synonymously with ‘predicate’, or it may be restricted to the case when there are no free variables,
recognising that at least some people see a proposition as a special case of a predicate, so suggesting ’predicate’ is the lead term.
Re 10, adding something along those lines sounds good, when we get the page straight.
Lots of philosophy students train on Hodges’ Logic. He writes
a predicate is defined to be a string of English words and individual variables, such that if the individual variables are replaced by appropriate designators, then the whole becomes a declarative sentence with these designators as constituents.
example
loves a bit of night-life.
Not quite sure why ’English’ has to be there.
But he then adds
The word predicate is often ued by grammarians and philosophers in ways which are at varaince with the definition we have given. For example, some people use the word to mean property or quality.
He uses ’declarative sentence’ rather than ’proposition’.
It’s an assembly of the second kind, of course! (cf. Bourbaki, Theorie des ensembles)
Re 14, can’t we link to this section, perhaps having expanded it?
Why not title it ’Predicate’ and then describe whatever we eventually decide about its relation to ’proposition’?
Because the two things were already at one page. It used to be titled predicate, but I decided that proposition would be a better name. Either way, one name has redirected to the other for months.
At predicate, we have
You mean at version 5 of the page. Once the cache is fixed, your link won’t link to the old version anymore.
The term proposition may be used synonymously with ‘predicate’, or it may be restricted to the case when there are no free variables,
I changed that because I think that it’s misleading. These people really just use ‘proposition’ only, keeping track of the context, because a predicate in one context is a proposition in an extension of . From this perspective, the basic concept is that of proposition in context.
A predicate is a special case of a proposition: a proposition in a context extended by free variables. A proposition is a special case of a predicate: a predicate in which the free variables do not appear.
He uses ’declarative sentence’ rather than ’proposition’.
Does he draw a distinction between these?
Re 14, can’t we link to this section, perhaps having expanded it?
Maybe; it seems like it should have its own page, although not much else is on that page. In any case, I’ve put the redirects there for now.
Possibly we need an introduction for philosophers and linguists. But I’m sure that keeping explicit track of context is the key to using these concepts well.
I added a section about propositional and predicate logic.
I’m sure that keeping explicit track of context is the key to using these concepts well.
Ditto.
Ok, things are making better sense for me now.
Re 22, Hodge doesn’t use the word ’proposition’ at all.
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