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IN the paper http://www.tac.mta.ca/tac/volumes/16/19/16-19abs.html Freyd states
- Theorem. There is a “rewrite” rule that converts any sentence in the logic of topoi with NNO (sometimes called intuitionistic type theory with the axiom of infinity) to an equally provable sentence in the logic of topoi (no axiom of infinity).
This seems quite extraordinary on face value. I can’t grok this straight up, does anyone have a conceptual explanation?
I find the paper very obscure, but I think his argument is the following. If we suppose a particular sort of axiom of infinity “”, then there exists an NNO. And using an NNO, we can construct the free topos-with-NNO. Now the “rewrite rule” takes a statement to the statement “if , then holds in the free topos-with-NNO”; call this statement .
If is provable in the logic of toposes, then since holds in sets, holds in the actual free topos-with-NNO, hence is provable in the logic of toposes-with-NNO. Conversely, if is provable in the logic of toposes-with-NNO, then it holds in the actual free topos-with-NNO. But Freyd constructs, internally to the free topos (without NNO), the “free topos with NNO assuming ” and shows that its global sections are the actual free topos-with-NNO. Hence must also hold for this internal topos-object in the free topos, and therefore is provable in the logic of toposes.
But don’t ask me to justify any of those intermediate steps, please. (-:
Are there any nice properties of this rewrite? Something to ensure that it’s not too trivial? (I could rewrite every sentence to , but that wouldn’t be interesting.)
This talk of “If the axiom of infinity holds, then holds.” reminds me of Fred Richman’s deliberately uninteresting method of making any result in classical mathematics constructively valid: rewrite as . (But apparently Freyd’s version is more sophisticated than that.)
I could rewrite every sentence to ⊤, but that wouldn’t be interesting.
It also wouldn’t be “equally provable”.
Somehow I got an extra “provable” when I read Theorem 1, and that nothing was claimed about unprovable statements. So that is one good property: every statement is rewritten, and the implication goes both ways. This still allows Richman’s , however.
It also allows us to rewrite statements as or accordingly as they are provable or not (assuming EM in the metalogic). This can be ruled out if the rewrite rule is computable.
One possibility: If the original statement is already expressible and provable in the language without infinity, then how is it rewritten?
I told you already in #2 everything I was able to gather about what the rewrite rule is. If I was right, it looks computable to me.
Thanks. It still seems terribly mysterious, and the looseness of the style of the paper does not help.
Agreed.
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