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started some minimum, prodded by the discussion here
currently it starts out like so:
In the philosophy of science, and particularly the philosophy of physics. empiricism is the philosophical sentiment that knowledge about the observable universe does and, ultimately, can only derive from empirical observation (experiment), as opposed to from internal reflection, such as in theoretical aestheticism and/or (absolute) idealism.
A contemporary variant of empriricism appears in discussion of the “multiverse” to the extent that this rejects the existence of a fundamental theory from which reality may be derived, and proclaims the necessity to simply observe fundamental fields and “constants of nature” as what they appear, giving up on theoretical explanation.
to fill this poor entry with a little bit of substance, I have added these lines
A variant of empiricism due to van Fraasen 80 came to be known as constructive empiricism which (according to SEP-CE, here)
holds that science aims at truth about observable aspects of the world, but that science does not aim at truth about unobservable aspects.
and the following pointers:
Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (1980) (philpapers:VANTSI,\linebreak doi:10.1093/0198244274.001.0001/acprof-9780198244271)
Stephen Leeds, Constructive Empiricism, Synthese Vol. 101, No. 2 (Nov., 1994), pp. 187-221 (jstor:20117956)
Richard Dawid, High Energy Physics and Constructive Empiricism (philsci:2243)
Richard Dawid, Scientific realism in the age of string theory, Physics and Philosophy (2007) (philpapers:DAWSRI)
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