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I found in one of the modal logic sources the following
Necessity = truth in all possible worlds
Possibility = truth in some possible world.
Discuss. :-)
Yes, this would be a good thing to discuss, for example in conjunction with Awodey-Kinisha. Hopefully soon!
You’re thinking it looks circular? Well, doesn’t it go like this?
Necessity = truth in all possible worlds,
Contingency = truth in some possible world.
As for what is a possible world, that’s another question. A possible (:-)) answer begins: “Consider a Kripke model …”
I never understand how this was supposed to make sense of sentences like . Even seems like a type mismatch to me.
I mean, I can read about and understand modal logics. It just has nothing to do with my intuition about alternative worlds.
@ Urs:
No, contingency = truth in some possible world but not in all possible worlds. That is, it’s contingent iff it’s possible but unnecessary.
My understanding, such as it is came, by looking at multiagent systems and the Muddy Children problem. To start with in that problem there are loots of worlds that may be possible but as the recursion happens this narrows down, but in a subtle non=deterministic way. Understanding that argument is very hard I think. The action on the models of the recursion seems to me to require a lot more study than is usually given to it in books.
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