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Wrote generic proof with some comments about a couple seemingly weaker versions of the axiom of choice that I've never seen mentioned anywhere before (has anyone else?). Toby and I noticed these a little bit ago while thinking about exact completions, but I just now realized that they're actually good for something: proving that the category of anafunctors between two small categories is essentially small (in the "projective" way).
I wrote in some material at generic proof which replaces one of the “seemingly”s with something more definitive (that the assumption “ is wellpowered” is weaker than “ is a topos”).
I added a diagram to generic proof, and explanations of what and mean (I assume).
trivial edit:
I changed an
\rlap
to
\mathrlap
The former has no effect. The latter does what you think it should do.
Is there a motivation behind the name? What is it a generic proof of?
I was about to suggest that a comment on that needs to be added.
I suppose this is referring to Proof as in type theory being just a “term of a type”, hence a map into some object. So a “generic proof” is like a universal bundle: any one on any given object is obtained from the generic/universal one by pulling it back along some classifying map.
I won’t add anything to the entry, since I don’t know the background. But it would be good if somebody else did.
Yes, that makes sense. I suppose its universal property is best understood in terms of some kind of fibred preorder reflection of the canonical codomain fibration of the category.
Undoubtedly related, the notion of tripos involves a notion of generic predicate, again involving a weak universal property that relates a base category of terms to a hyperdoctrine of predicates over . It is especially easy to describe if is cartesian closed: if is the hyperdoctrine and its composition with the forgetful functor to , then a generic predicate is tantamount to weak representability of , i.e., an object together with a given epimorphism . The image of the identity as an element of is the generic predicate in question.
I don’t have a very full understanding of this, but there are two paths to get from a partial combinatory algebra to a realizability topos. One is through triposes and generic predicates and involves a kind of allegorical way of passing to an exact completion:
First pass from a unitary pretabular allegory given by a tripos associated with , to a unitary tabular allegory, by splitting coreflexives. This is analogous to a regular completion.
Then split equivalence relations in the unitary tabular allegory. This is analogous to taking an ex/reg completion.
(The two steps can be combined into one by splitting PERs. But I find it more understandable to think of it in two steps.)
The other path is through partitioned assemblies associated with . This is a category with weak dependent products and a generic proof. By Menni’s thesis, the exact completion of this category is a topos.
I would really like to have a unified understanding of these two paths, and have this reflected in the nLab.
I don’t quite understand the origin of the name “generic proof” either, except for the same vague intuition as in Urs’s #6.
Even if we don't know the truth, we could add the vague intuition of Urs #6 as a conjecture. It would make the whole thing seems less of a non sequitur.
I don’t mean to highjack the thread, but I’d like to reply to what Todd wrote about the two kinds of realizability constructions:
I would really like to have a unified understanding of these two paths, and have this reflected in the nLab.
So would I, and I’m writing my thesis on one aspect of that understanding, namely that you can organise predicates into either fibrations (like the effective tripos) or bicategories of relations (like Rel of the category of assemblies), and that with enough structure the 2-categories of these are equivalent. There is a(n unfinished) sketch of some of this on my personal web here. (Do ask if you’d like to know more; I intend to flesh this out when I get time.)
Here’s what I’m not doing (this is all due to Pieter Hofstra): say you start with a pca , e.g. the naturals with Kleene application. You can form an indexed poset that I’ll call (even though the ordering is not the pointwise one but the ’realizability’ one). The category of elements of this is the category of partitioned assemblies over . For any pca , the sets and of subsets and non-empty subsets of are again pcas and give indexed posets in the same way; the category of elements of is the category of assemblies over , while is the realizability tripos over .
This last is a regular fibration, so corresponds to (what I call) a framed bicategory of relations, and the (underlying bicategory of the) coreflexive splitting of the latter is Rel of the category of assemblies over . From that point on, the two paths coincide. (I’d very much like to understand the earlier parts of the two processes better, but then I’d also like to finish my thesis sometime this decade…)
@Todd:
Johnstone (in Definition F2.2.4) uses “exemplary element” instead of “generic predicate” or “generic element”. The definition is for a -indexed preorder , where is cartesian closed: an exemplary element is an element for some such that, for each , every object in is isomorphic to for some (not necessarily unique) .
Surely, the construction I suggested converts generic proofs into generic predicates? First of all, the preorder reflection is a 2-functor , so we can certainly do a fibrewise preorder reflection on any indexed category ; call it for now. If is the self-indexing of a regular category with the axiom of choice then this should be equivalent to the indexed preorder , by the observations at generic proof, and otherwise it’s some kind of souped-up version of . Regardless, a generic proof in is precisely an object in a fibre such that , regarded as an object in , is a generic predicate in .
Whoa, Part F exists now? Where can I find it?
I’m not sure if Part F exists in full, but Johnstone is basically lecturing Chapter F2 as a graduate course in Cambridge this term. Perhaps he might email you a copy if you ask? All I have (so far) are paper printouts of the first three sections. Parts of Chapter F1 have also been written up, at least according to a fellow student who works in synthetic differential geometry.
I have now replaced the other tentative assertion in the section axioms of choice with something more definitive: another paper of Menni’s shows that the exact completion of a Boolean Grothendieck topos with enough points is also a topos.
@Zhen: Cool! I’ll probably wait for the final version; I don’t exactly need more reading material right now.
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