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earlier today I had started splitting off entries intensional type theory and extensional type theory from type theory. But then the Lab halted and now it’s left in somewhat stubby form.
I added an additional equivalent characterization of extensional type theory: that equality in the total space of a dependent type implies equality in the fiber. (This is a frequent “how do I prove this obvious fact?” question on the coq-club mailing list.)
I split the definition of extensional type theory into “definitional” and “propositional” flavors, and included a proof I just learned which shows that in the presence of Id-induction, the equality reflection rule is enough to make the theory extensional: you don’t need to assert separately that any proof of equality is equal to reflexivity.
I left a query box there after responding to it, in hopes that its poster would find it and come here.
Well, it didn’t work, so I’m moving the discussion to here:
I don’t want to unilaterally edit this page, but #3 above is fairly different than any of the others (except maybe #2), and it is pretty much the only one that I’ve ever heard type theorists talking about when they say “extensional type theory.” It is the difference between Martin-Löf’s intensional and extensional type theory. Intensional has the J eliminator, and extensional has the inference rule from propositional equality to judgmental equality.
Dependent pattern matching, K, uniqueness of identity proofs and the like don’t get you the equivalent of reflecting the propositions back into the judgments, and that is what makes extensional type theory in the eyes of type theorists (as far as I’ve encountered), not the dimension of the identity types. For instance, Agda is considered intensional despite having K, and even Observational Type Theory ala Conor McBride, which adds lots of extensionality axioms for various types, and eta-ish rules when possible, is still arguably intensional in this sense. And that is the whole point in OTT’s case, because the decidability issues (mentioned below) are tied to extensionality in the inference rule sense, not any homotopy sense.’
Also, I expect the bit about functional extensionality came from a discussion with me on n-cafe. But, it’s not really true that type theorists use ’extensional type theory’ to refer to theories in which functional extensionality holds. I believe my point in that discussion was that ’extensional equality type’ (or similar) suggested to me a type that reified the extensional equivalence (equality) relation of the type it was defined for (so, Eq A a b would have an inhabitant if a is extensionally equal to b of type A), and didn’t immediately suggest an identity type that was a homotopy proposition. For instance, the identity types in OTT reify extensional equality in this sense. And extensional type theories (for instance, NuPRL) typically incorporate this, because they can, whereas Agda (for instance) does not. HTT identity types are reifying extensional equality of functions, as well, and perhaps would work for coinductive types as well (whenever those get worked out).
But that is about my impression of “(extensional identity) type” not “extensional (identity type),” the latter of which might be an identity type in extensional type theory, which has little to do with what sort of relations it’s reifying.
— Dan Doel
Thanks for your suggestions; I’ve tried to incorporate some of them. If you want to discuss this more, I suggest opening a post at the nForum (and copying this query box there). You could join this discussion for instance.
– Mike Shulman
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